Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 28

Issue 1

Article 4

2-2008

Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society
Mirko Blagojevic
Belgrade University, Serbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Blagojevic, Mirko (2008) "Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society," Occasional Papers on
Religion in Eastern Europe: Vol. 28 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol28/iss1/4

This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

DESECULARIZATION OF CONTEMPORARY SERBIAN SOCIETY
Mirko Blagojevic
Mirko Blagojevic is sociologist of religion, a research associate of the Institute for
Philosophy and Social Theory which is a part of the Belgrade University, Serbia. He is
also a part-time sociology professor at the Technical College in Pozarevac and editor-inchief of the journal 'The Collection of Scientific Texts” of the Technical College in
Pozarevac. He is mostly concerned with various subjects from the sociology of religion
(Eastern Orthodoxy) and has published many articles and two books: Approaching
Orthodoxy and Religion and Church in Social Transformations.

Abstract: For the contemporary Serbian sociology of religion it is evident that the process of
desecularization has been present on the social scene of Serbia in the last fifteen years.
Sociologists have provided arguments for this claim based on data gathered in Serbia during this
period. The religious changes in question have been empirically recorded in all aspects of
attachment to religion (mainly Eastern Orthodoxy) and the church (Serbian Orthodox Church),
that is, in aspects of religious identification, doctrinal beliefs and religious behavior. Certain
political subjects and social scientists feel that social life in Serbia is getting increasingly
religious, and that religion and church are exerting influence within social fields they are not
supposed to, if Serbia is to become a secular, democratic state. The paper analyzes some major
conditions of the clericalization of the Serbian society.
To be engaged in scientific research of religion in Serbia nowadays, and
especially in empirical research of religious changes in Eastern Orthodoxy, does not
imply simply researching an exotic spiritual and social phenomenon like thirty years
ago, which, according to the public opinion of the time, belonged rather to the past than
the present, rather to a ''museum of antiquities'' than a living social phenomenon,
rather to a small group of uneducated, marginalized and committed people than the
majority of citizens, propulsive and elite social groups. The situation has drastically
changed. To be engaged in the religious phenomenon nowadays, especially in the
processes of secularization and desecularization, actually means being modern, at the
source of certain important social changes which in the Balkans can by no means be
understood outside of the confessional, religious and national contexts. More
importantly, it is much more politically acceptable nowadays to be in contact with
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religion in accordance with scientific principles and draw conclusions on the religious
situation within a particular area without the burden of a politically correct and
expected religious scene. It may be argued that the general social settings for religious
research have changed significantly. These social settings, among other things, led the
privatized, marginalized and stigmatized religion and numerous confessions to emerge
from the underground into the light and to start playing important public roles,
something that just 15 or 20 years ago could not be foreseen.
Such a situation has opened wide the door for the sociology of religion to study
in vivo the religious phenomenon with its different aspects in action, that is, the way
religions and confessions influence the opinions and behavior of many people who
have suddenly found themselves in very difficult, ambivalent war and post-war
situations being full of hope, exaltation, fanaticism and unrealistic expectations at first,
and then of despair, hopelessness, deprivation, and frustrations of all kinds, ending up
in a state of resignation in the past couple of years. Although in the early 1990s it was
believed that Serbian sociology of religion would fully take advantage of the newly
opened opportunities, now we can only talk about partial success. The few existing
Serbian sociologists of religion have done a substantial job, if we bear in mind that they
have lacked broad institutionalized support for research, especially empirical research.
They had to overcome this lack through originality, enthusiasm, and their personal
contacts.
If we make a comparison with the neighboring countries, then Serbian sociology
of religion cannot claim systematic and representative empirical evidence on current
religious changes. Until five or six years ago, even when there was opportunity to look
into conventional and unconventional religiousness on a representative sample,
sociologists failed to do it, partly due to the lack of a sense of religion (although religion
was an obligatory subject of research for the pioneers of sociology) and mostly because
there were not many sociologists who were interested in empirical testing of
hypotheses on religiousness in the Serbian confessional area. However, although the
situation for religious research in Serbia was highly unfavorable, Serbian sociology of
religion nevertheless has had a few strongholds that could be taken as a starting point
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for the research of contemporary attachment to the church and religion: in the 1980s
this refers to research by Djordjević (D. Djordjević, 1984), in the early 1990s the study
undertaken by the present author (Blagojevic, 1995) and later an omnibus study done
in 1999 (Radisavljević-Ciparizović, 2002), as well as a large number of other public
opinion researches or segmentary researches with modest samples and goals. All these
studies can be taken as a basis for monitoring religious changes in Serbia from the
seventies up to now.
This body of research has provided a great deal of argumentation for the three
tendencies regarding the processes of secularization and desecularization, that is, the
processes of atheization and deatheization in Serbia during the period in question. Up
to the mid- or even late eighties of the previous century, it was already obvious that
people were displaying a tendency to detach themselves from religion and church. This
was usually viewed as the atheization of the socialist society, although the sociologists
of religion of the time were inclined to regard this tendency as an indicator of the
process of secularization. Shyly at first, in the late 1980s, and quite openly in the early
1990s, the revitalization of religion and church was becoming increasingly obvious,
with a large number of people growing close with mostly renowned religious
expressions and institutionalized religious organizations; religious pluralism was
thriving, as was the case in the geographical and confessional areas of the former Soviet
Union. The tendency manifested itself in several ways: as a reaffirmation and a
revitalization of the church, as a retraditionalization and a retotalization, as a revival
of religion and church and the return of the holy, even as a reconquista and a religious
renaissance. Sociologists were in favor of terming this tendency “desecularization” of
the postsocialist society. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new
millennium the tendency from the previous period settled as a relatively stable and
steady attachment of people towards religion and the church, and as a very tight
intertwining of the religious (ecclesiastical) and the political (social), the process which
certain religious and social scientists tend to regard as clericalization of the
contemporary Serbian society.
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Some Indicators of the Desecularization of Serbian Society
It is generally accepted that the socialist system in former Yugoslavia created
non-stimulating and basically hostile social settings for religion and church in general.
The first consequence of such a treatment of religion and its institutionalized
organizations by the socialist government was not just their cultural and general social
demonopolization

and

marginalization,

but

particularly

their

economic

demonopolization. Of all religions the separation of the church and the state struck
Orthodoxy the hardest, since alienation and separation from the state was directly
opposite to the essence of Orthodoxy, which throughout history built a relationship of
understanding, cooperation and mutual support (symphony) with the state. This nonstimulating, general social setting and the atheistic, hegemonic cultural pattern of the
socialist society proved to be rather maleficent for the actual state of religiousness, its
free expression and the general attachment of people towards religion and church. The
consequences were perceptible on at least three levels: religion and church definitely
lost their social significance, conventional religious beliefs grew weaker, but the
greatest decline was noted in the field of religious and church rituals. In this way,
Orthodox religiousness in the Yugoslav socialist state could be seen as specific in
regard to the religiousness in other monoconfessional and multireligious areas. It
comprised continuous low scores of religious subjects in empirical research, then an
obvious dissolution of the dogmatic content of faith, and a process of erosion of the
conventional religious behavior (D.Djordjević, 1984).
Although at the very beginning of 1980s empirical evidence could not prove
beyond doubt that Orthodoxy was coming back to the social scene in the local religious
areas, it was during that period, after the events in Kosovo (which was later to become
the central social and political problem in former Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, and finally Serbia today), that
Orthodoxy emerged from several decades of isolation and of being on the margins of
social and political life in the socialist Yugoslav state, back onto the social and political
scene. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s empirical sociological researchers
were already registering an increase in religiousness and a growing attachment of a
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large number of people towards religion and church in the entire geographical and
confessional area of former Yugoslavia, even an increase in the Orthodox religiousness
whose revitalization was coming rather late in comparison with Catholic confessional
areas of former Yugoslavia. The bulk of this revitalization of the religion and church
was not a result of an eminently religious process in terms of a sincere and deep change
in the spiritual life of people, for instance through their return to the long-forgotten
God and religious morality, through their aspiration to spiritualize their life and change
their behavior (for, the period from the nineties on was marked by an incredible
outburst of hate, violence, and suffering in the territory of the former federation).
Rather, the revitalization of religion and church in the entire area (and Orthodoxy is no
exception) began within major socio-political turbulences that manifested mainly as a
product of an obvious and long-lasting social crisis, and in that way as a result (but a
cause as well) of the collapse of socialism and of social, territorial, national and
confessional homogenization of the population in the republics of former Yugoslavia.
The position of an increasingly evident social significance, as the most
important characteristic of the revitalized Orthodoxy and other confessions in the
territory of former Yugoslavia, implied the emergence of religion and church from the
marginality and social excommunication, and their transformation into one of the most
important social institutions with numerous public roles in the forthcoming social
events burdened with serious conflicts. Therefore, in the early 1980s and especially
during the 1990s, Orthodoxy became the most important, maybe even the key factor
in revived Serbian collective identity as a continuous and the only reliable guardian of
tradition and historical memory. The Serbian Orthodox Church then took on the role
of beacon in the protection and homogenization of Serbian national entity, with its
social relevance and institutionalized spiritual centralism, in the conditions of socialism
still present at the time, constantly growing. Such centralism became even more
evident after the fall of socialism, when it was absolutely necessary to take under
protection and homogenize the Serbian national body in Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and from the late 1990s onwards, in Kosovo and Metohija as well.
Therefore, during the period of general politicization of culture in the entire territory
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of former Yugoslavia, Orthodoxy was also politicized, in a positive way, as one of the
most efficient spiritual resources in the national homogenization of the population and
their political mobilization for the conflicts to come and during the conflicts themselves.
So the collapse of socialism (communism) and the civil, international war served as the
most general social setting in which Orthodoxy was to regain its cultural domination
and institutionalized significance and influence it used to have. There could have been
no revival of Serbian national identity and the Serbian state without the revival of
Orthodoxy. The Serbian Orthodox Church is not only a religious institution, but a
national one as well, and probably the only institution that had never betrayed Serbian
people throughout history (Radić, 955:V; XVII-XVIII).
Religious changes in Orthodoxy in the last fifteen years have been empirically
documented in all aspects of attachment to Orthodoxy and the Serbian Orthodox
Church, namely the aspects of religious identification, doctrinal beliefs and religious
ritual behavior. During the previous decade the willingness of people to identify
themselves in religious terms, to reveal their confessional belonging and to believe in
God has grown. Likewise, changes in religious consciousness had certain practical
consequences for the religious behavior and beliefs among a great number of people
in Orthodox and multi-religious areas of Serbia. Although only slight changes were
detected in the traditional attitude towards religion and church, which was considered
the most stable in the previous decades, certain changes were obvious in the essentially
important actual religious behavior in fulfilling religious commitments such as liturgy,
church attendance, fasting etc. Fundamental religious beliefs of Orthodoxy have also
been revitalized, mostly those that were far from being eschatological in character. The
following tables indicate that religious changes in Serbia were following the direction
of desecularization of the Serbian society.
TABLE 1
Certain indicators of religiousness in Serbia in the last twenty years (%)
1982
1993
1999
Indicators/year of research
Positive confessional
identification
Self-declared classic religiousness
Child baptism

88.0

96.7

93.5

23.8
59.3

71.3
84.4

59.3
83.9
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Celebration of religious holidays
Church burial
Liturgy (all intensities)
Church attendance (all intensities)
Praying (all intensities)
Fasting
Believing in God
Believing in Jesus Christ
Believing in life after death

57.9
6.8
25.5
24.4
24.2
17.6
15.4
5.4

93.3
92.4
26.3
70.5
77.7
58.4
46.3
56.7
28.2

86.6
86.1
48.1
74.8
69.7
58.5
-

Ref: For 1982 Djordjević's research of religiousness in the predominantly Orthodox region of Niš
(D.Djordjević, 1984); for 1993 Blagojevic's research of the predominantly Orthodox region of Branicevo

(Blagojevic, 1995); for 1999 the research made by the Institute for Sociological Research of the
Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade on a sample representative for Serbia without Kosovo and
Metohija (Radisavljević-Ciparizović, 2005)
TABLE 2
Traditional attachment to religion and church in Serbia (%)
Attachment/year of research
1993
1999
Total attachment
68.7
74.6
Partial attachment
30.8
25.1
Total unattachment
0.5
0.3

Ref: Blagojevic, 1995; Radisavljević-Ciparizović, 2005

TABLE 3
Actual attachment to religion and church in Serbia (%)
Attachment/year of research
1993
Total attachment
0.2
Partial attachment
85.2
Total unattachment
14.6

Ref: Blagojević, 1995; Radisavljević-Ćiparizović, 2005

1999
36.4
43.5
20.1

By generalizing these and other empirical data which were not stated in this
text (see Blagojevic, 2005), it is possible to draw several relevant conclusions that could
be used to describe the current process of religious changes in Serbian society:
1. By the 1990s, religiousness in all confessional and national groups in the territory of
former Yugoslavia was growing, although not at the same level, with the lowest
number of religious people being recorded among the Orthodox, the trend which was
later proved by the cited studies. However, an evident change in the religiousness of
population was detected in the Orthodox confession as well, which was neither
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accidental nor subject to greater fluctuations. The increase of religiousness and the
increased willingness of people to identify themselves in confessional terms, although
already high, were closely related to broader social, that is, eminently non-religious
processes such as the collapse of socialism as a social system and the territorial and
national homogenization at the time of disintegration of the federal state and the
creation of separate national states. The analysis of quantitative data revealed that it
was through the religiousness of young generations that the significant religious
changes occurred, especially within the Orthodox civilization. Another conclusion
drawn from the research made in the late 1980s and early 1990s pointed to a stable
trend of religious restructuring. The number of atheistically orientated people has been
drastically reduced. During the nineties the willingness of people to identify
themselves in religious terms, to reveal their confessional belonging and to believe in
God increased. It was clear that religion was revitalizing in some components of the socalled religious consciousness.
2. During the nineties changes in the religious consciousness of the population had
practical consequences for religious behavior and beliefs among a large number of
people. The traditional attitude towards religion and the church, which had been least
controversial even before, spread even more, so in the nineties there was a vast
majority of people in the homogenized Orthodox territories who were traditionally
attached to religion and the church. Some essentially important religious behaviors
such as praying, liturgy, and fasting during major religious holidays were also
revitalized. Nowadays the homogenized Orthodox area can no longer be considered
as an area with largely eroded rituals of religious nature and with the population
''running away'' from religion and the church. Fundamental religious beliefs in
Orthodoxy were also revitalized, primarily those that were far from being
eschatological in character.
3. In view of these religious changes, the portrait of a typical believer at the end of the
1990s is very different from that of a typical believer in the eighties. A typical believer
used to be a woman, a farmer or a worker or an elderly person, living in the country,
not very educated and belonging to a socially marginalized or underprivileged social
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group. Today, a typical believer can be from either rural or urban background, either
elderly or young, either male or female, either uneducated or highly educated. The
changed portrait of typical believer displays all the relevant elements of the sociological
analysis of major religious changes in contemporary Serbian society.
Desecularization or Clericalization of Serbian Society
Before the 1990s, in the entire territory of socialist Yugoslavia, and in Serbia as
well, it was unthinkable for the law to allow religious services in schools, hospitals,
military and police institutions, kindergartens and prisons. Churches were not
regarded as public institutions and organizations nor were they allowed to establish
institutions such as non-theological schools, kindergartens, general secondary schools,
other trade and art schools or universities enjoying complete autonomy and
government support in terms of being equal with the state-owned institutions
providing their users public health protection, student standards and other benefits
identical with those in public schools. These benefits and many others are now enjoyed
by churches and religious communities registered as legal entities rather than civil
associations, as they used to be before the recent adoption of the Law on Church and
Religious Communities. According to the law, religious communities may engage in
trade and other activities in accordance with legal regulations, that is, they are allowed
to establish profitable enterprises that they may run autonomously, radio and TV
stations and other institutions of religious and non-religious character. This completely
changed way of handling relations between the state and religious organizations, and
the obvious influence of religion and the Serbian Orthodox Church on public life in
Serbia in recent years, provoked a reaction of some political subjects and social
scientists who have argued that public life in Serbia is getting increasingly clericalized
and that the church and religion are exerting influence in the areas where they
shouldn't if Serbia is to become a secular, democratic country.
Sociologist Bozidar Jakić has registered continuous attempts and aspirations
for the clericalization of Serbian society, and not just through the endeavors of certain
political subjects and some high-ranking members of the Serbian Orthodox Church, but
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some renowned democrat intellectuals as well (Svetozar Stojanović, for example). His
claim that the process is not finished, that it is not even dominant, but rather bidirectional, confusing and contradictory, is of crucial sociological significance. In some
occasions it is a useful tool for solving political crises in daily politics and in others it
is about fundamental, mortal endangerment of Serbian people that no other system nor
spiritual institution but the Serbian Orthodox Church can salvage from disaster (Jakić,
2001). Clericalization of public life was not initiated solely from clerical circles, but it
often presents a blatant or hidden instrumentalization of religion and the church whose
final outcome does not serve the interests of the church but the interests of various
political groups instead. There are numerous examples of the return of the church and
religion into public life, but not all of them prove the process of clericalization: for
instance, the introduction of religious education, first compulsory and then optional,
into primary and secondary schools; promotion of religion and the church in the media
through coverage of religious events but also secular events accompanied by religious
iconography; high regard for the opinions of highly ranked church officials and
practicing believers on purely secular problems and issues; aspirations of the members
of church hierarchy to connect with the political subjects in power in order to infiltrate
into political circles, etc. And vice versa: members of the political power elite are not
indifferent towards the church, especially towards the Serbian Orthodox Church, and
they willingly meet the demands of the church hierarchy. In that way the distance
between the state and the church is getting smaller, which is, as Milan Vukomanović
points out, clearly leading towards the clericalization of the Serbian society (Karabeg,
2004).
The conquest of the public domain in the (re)distribution of political, military
and economic power by the church and its attempt to arbitrate in socially relevant
issues were most systematically criticized by the sociologist of religion Mirko
Djordjević (M. Djordjević, 2005a; 2005b) who cites many examples of forced
clericalization. Describing the influence of the church on the public life of Serbian
society as a “wave of clericalization”, he feels that the process ”has gone really far” and
that there is a kind of consensus on the Serbian Orthodox Church “being the only
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integrative factor” and thus claiming the leading role in society. “The Serbian Orthodox
Church has long been a part of public government and the constitutional regulations
on the separation of the church and the state are of little significance.” (M. Djordjević,
2005a). Although we agree with this author on many comments about the attempts of
the church hierarchy and political and social groups to clericalize the Serbian society,
it is more than necessary to raise a purely sociological question regarding
terminological precision. Using in his analyses of church and social life the term
“desecularization,” he transfers the meaning of another term, the term
countersecularization, since it is precisely the latter term, rather than “desecularization”,
that is opposite to “secularization”. If secularization is an irreversible process, then a
re-creation of class society with a medieval role for gentry and clergy is beyond
assumption, but desecularization as a process and a “middle” term is not, since the
influence of the church and religion on the society may increase or reduce throughout
history. Therefore, this term is not on the verge of delusion or utopia, as Mirko
Djordjević suggested, but can be used quite legitimately in sociological issues, it can
even be operationalized through indicators that may be presented both qualitatively
and quantitatively.
Terminological problems, therefore, do not present a purely academic taste for
pinpoint accuracy. Even sociological arguments lack a clear definition of basic terms
at the beginning. It is often a cause of unnecessary misunderstandings. What is
clericalism really, and along with it, the process of clericalization of a society? If we
define this phenomenon as an aspiration of certain political circles to make the church
and clergy superior in the political and cultural lives of a country or society, that is to
place the interests of the church above all others in the society so that church can
impose its interests on the society, the intention which has realistic political and
economic grounds, then it cannot be argued that clericalization of Serbia is an
uncontroversial phenomenon. Contemporary Serbian historian Slobodan Marković
thoroughly analyzed the conditions of clericalization of a democratic society and
concluded that contemporary Serbian society was not clericalized (Marković, 2005).
Instead, it was actually another process in action in the history of modern Serbia
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(during the last two hundred years): the process of caesaropapism.
For the process of clericalization to be effective in Serbia, Marković cites three
conditions that have to be met: the number of institutionalized, practicing believers
must considerably exceed half of the total population; there must be a tradition of
strong clerical spirit; and the church and clergy must possess enough economic and
political power to impose themselves as an equal or even senior partner on the state.
The first condition is not met in contemporary Serbia, and it is debatable if it has ever
been. That is, according to the 2002 census and sociological and public opinion surveys
in the last 15 years, it is obvious that the number of declared believers in Serbia is large,
even up to 95%, 85% of whom are of Orthodox religion. But of all indicators of
attachment to religion and the church this one is the weakest. How many believers are
there in Serbia today who are closely and ardently connected to the church? There are
definitely a lot less of them than confessionally declared believers, and that is a weak
potential for the effective clericalization of a society.
In the recent history of Serbia, Marković feels, there hasn't been a tradition of
clerical spirit that modern clericalism could build on successfully. Before the first
Serbian uprising, a part of the population had left Serbia with patriarch Arsenije III
Carnojević during the Great Migrations in 1690 and settled in the Hungarian part of the
Habsburg monarchy, where Serbs and their church were tolerated as a minority, so
there could have been no clericalization under those conditions. The Serbian people
and the Patriarchate of Peć had to put up with the Turkish power that always used to
have a caesaropapist attitude towards Christian churches and never had any restraints
to kill any bishop that might stand in their way. After the Serbian revolution in 1804,
during the 19th century, it was evident that the state was trying to interfere in church
affairs and had a caesaropapist attitude towards the church. The overt interference of
the government, the non-canonic appointments of the highest church officials and even
their physical elimination (Milos Obrenović had the first Serbian bishop Milentije
Nikić strangled) are evidence enough that there could have been no clericalization
under such circumstances, but only more or less obvious state interference in church
affairs and a strong, “Constantinian embrace” that the church could not escape even
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after World War II. Therefore, it could be said that state interference in church affairs
and exploitation of the church for the promotion of secular, partial political interests
have never really stopped, except for a short period of time before the World War II
when the Serbian Orthodox Church was the only one with enough power to challenge
the state. Not even clerical political movements, founded in the twentieth century, have
ever had serious voter support, so they have been kept aside in the political life of the
country. In socialist Yugoslavia the political capital of the church was extremely low,
since religion and the church were stigmatized and marginalized, not only politically
but also economically. Thus, in the last sixty years the Serbian Orthodox Church has
never been a significant economic factor in Serbia. Marković argues that no conditions
that could indicate clericalization of Serbian society have been met, but there are certain
indications that the caesaropapist attitude towards the church is becoming weaker and
it is time the church itself finally broke free of the state or the political elite in power.
It is true that if the state returned to the churches, and especially the Serbian
Orthodox Church, the property confiscated after World War II, economic
empowerment of the church would become realistic. This is supported by the fact that
the contemporary Serbian state is far more generous in financing and supporting the
construction of new churches and restoration of the old churches in Serbia than twenty
years ago. Along with the increased public, and even political influence of the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Serbian society today, elements of the process of clericalization
would not be so disputable as they may seem now. Therefore, there are elements that
suggest a much tighter connection between the church and the state in Serbia today
than in the past. The church has become one of the basic institutions of contemporary
Serbian society, and the Orthodox religion has become an absolute fact and the leading
spiritual guidance in the search of the Serbian people for their lost identity. To be
terminologically correct, the increased influence that the church has been exercising on
society in the last decade and a half, and a stronger commitment to religion and church,
are at this moment better termed as a process of desecularization. Namely, the
clericalization of the society pushed to its limits would actually present a
countersecularization of the society that would be hard to conceive not only in Europe
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but in post-Milosević Serbia as well.
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